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TI Sgood to have this opportunity to present my
views regarding inflation and the economic outlook.
I find it rather sobering to reflect that our country, as
well as most other major industrial countries, has ex-
perienced almost a decade of rising inflation. In re-
viewing economic history, I find that we are at a point
similar to 1939 in that then too our country, along with
the rest of the world, was ending a decade
of economic difficulty — a recession. The disquieting
similarity is that in both instances some prominent
individuals could see no end to the situation in sight
and counseled us to learn to live with it.
I rejected the idea then and I reject it now. I con-
tinue to believe that we have the knowledge to bring
this devastating inflation under control, Economic sta-
bilization actions formnlated and acted upon now will
be the most important influence on our economy, not
only during late 1974, but over the balance of the
1970s. Our present concern is for simultaneously re-
ducing inflation and permitting growth of output to
return to a rate consistent with optimal utilization of
our nation’s productive potential.
Recently, two sharply divergent views have been
advanced regarding the proper course of economic
stabilization policy at this time. One view is that ex-
pansionary actions must be taken immediately to
guide the economy to so-called “full employment”.
The other view is that restrictive actions must be
taken to reduce the rate of inflation.
The recognized importance of stabilization actions
for the future, and the conflicting recommendations
surfacing around us, dictate that we examine the ex-
perience of stabilization actions over the last decade
to seek out some lessons which can be helpful in se-
lecting an appropriate course of action now and for
the future. The last decade was onc of accelerating
inflation and, at limes, deviations of output growth
from our nation’s productive potential.
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In developing some of the lessons from past stabili-
zation efforts, it is helpful to make a brief survey of
the premises which had a dominant influence on pol-
icy actions taken over much of the past decade. Once
these have been outlined, the experience of the past
decade will be reviewed to evaluate the usefulness of
these premises as a basis for undertaking future sta-
bilization actions. Finally, against the background of
these lessons, the implications for inflation and the
economic outlook of the two policy alternatives will
be discnssed.
PREMISES OF STABILIZATION POLICY
OVER THE PAST DECADE
Let us now review the premises which guided sta-
bilization efforts during the past decade. A foremost
premise was that positive government actions were
required to produce proper growth of output of goods
and services so as to assure “full employment” of our
labor and industrial resources. In other words, many
observers contended that without active government
guidance our economy would tend to produce an un-
acceptable level of employment and growth of output.
There were two premises regarding the causes of
inflation. One premise was that inflation, for the most
part, did not normally occur unless aggregate demand
for goods and services was “pushed” to a level close to
or greater than our economy’s ability to produce. But
this need not happen, it was argned, because govern-
ment actions could be used to assure that the level of
aggregate demand would never be in excess of capac-
ity output.
The other premise was that special factors could, at
times, cause inflation. Some important factors cited
were the use of industrial monopoly power, the exer-
cise of labor market power by strong unions, special
conditions in major domestic markets, and rising prices
of internationally traded commodities.
In summary, it was believed that so-called “full em-
ployment” of our resources would not naturally occur;
therefore, government should take actions for promot-
ing growth of aggregate demand so that output would
be at our economy’s productive potential. Given skill-
ful application of aggregate demand management, in-
flation need not occur, except for that attributed to
special factors which were believed to be beyond the
control of traditional stabilization tools.
Four major propositions guided the implementation
of economic stabilization policy over most of the last
decade. First, the dominant view was that fiscal ac-
tions, that is, changes in government spending and
taxing programs, were the most effective means for
guiding the course of output along a non-inflationary,
“full employment” path. Second, monetary actions
were viewed as being of minor importance. Federal
Reserve actions were assigned an accommodative role
in the sense that they should be directed toward pro-
moting a level of market interest rates consistent with
the over-all intent of stabilization policy. A third prop-
osition was that management of aggregate demand
should be conducted on a short-run basis of a few
quarters. The fourth proposition was that selective in-
comes and price policies were necessary to control
inflation arising in monopoly industries and in in-
dustries dominated by powerful labor unions.
STABILIZATION ACTIONS TAKEN
An examination of the record indicates that stabili-
zation authorities were very busy over the past dec-
ade. The policy tool that received the most attention
during that time was fiscal actions. I will cite just a
few examples of its use. There was the Revenue Act
of 1964 which included across-the-board rate reduc-
tions in personal and corporate income taxes; the
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 which
imposed a temporary ten percent surcharge on per-
sonal and corporate income taxes; and the on-again,
off-again, investment tax credit. At times, such as in
1969, 1971, and 1973, attempts were made to hold
down increases in government spending.
The Federal Reserve was also very active in eco-
nomic stabilization during the past ten years. For
example, from 1964 to 1973, the Federal Open Market
Committee, commonly referred to as the FOMC, met
141 times, and at seventy percent of these meetings a
policy of restraint was adopted. Only in 1967 and 1970
did the FOMC adopt a policy of ease at virtually
every meeting.
Throughout most of the past decade FOMC actions
were directed mainly toward promoting an appropri-
ate level of market interest rates. For the most part,
these actions can be said to have been accommoda-
tive, in the sense that although interest rates were
permitted to rise, the FOMC attempted to restrict
interest rates to levels believed to be not so high as to
interfere with the achievement of full employment.
Even though more emphasis was given to movements
in monetary aggregates late in the decade, open mar-
ket transactions continued to be subject to an interest
rate constraint.
Finally, when inflation threatened to reaccelerate
in 1971, a time of excess capacity, it was believed by
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many that the inflationary situation was due to special
factors; as a result, price and wage controls were
adopted. Since then, these controls have gone through
two complete cycles — from freeze to guidelines to
thaw, then back to freeze, guidelines, and phase-out.
For the most part, these controls were administered
on a selective basis.
UNDESIRED RESULTS CAN SERVE
AS LEARNING EXPERIENCE
What have been the end results of these activist
economic stabilization actions taken over the past
decade? Our economy has experienced a high, and
accelerating rate of inflation, which still persists.
There was a shallow recession in 1970, followed by a
period of slow recovery. Market interest rates rose to
their highest levels in fifty years. At times severe dis-
locations occurred in commodity, labor, and financial
markets, At the present time our economy is under-
going what some have labeled “stagflation”.
From these events it is quite apparent that, in spite
of good intentions and much effort, economic stabiliza-
tion actions have not produced desired results. So let
us now examine this experience for some lessons which
may be helpful in planning future stabilization efforts.
Accelerating inflation started when our economy
began to operate at capacity levels in the mid-1960s,
tending to confirm the view that mismanagement of
aggregate demand could cause inflation. But then in
1970 and 1971, when output fell and continued to re-
main considerably below capacity, inflation remained
high, contrary to the view that inflation would quickly
subside when aggregate demand was less than capac-
ity output. So, the cause of inflation was then attrib-
uted to monopoly and labor union power. But the
record of the decade indicates that there was little, if
any, increase in industrial concentration and that
membership in labor unions as a percent of the labor
force actually declined.
Thus, it appears that it was a fallacy to base mone-
tary and fiscal actions on the proposition that they
need to be concerned about inflation only when ag-
gregate demand is pushed in the neighborhood of our
economy’s productive potential. A second fallacy, sug-
gested by this experience, was that the rate of inflation
would quickly subside if aggregate demand is held be-
low productive potential for only a few quarters. A
third fallacy was that industrial monopolies and labor
unions are an important cause of inflation,
Another lesson from the past decade’s experience
is that an activist policy cannot easily guide aggregate
demand in such a manner as to promote a relatively
low unemployment rate with little inflation. Since
1961, the beginning of activism in economic stabili-
zation, the unemployment rate has averaged 4.9 per-
cent. This is the same as in the Eisenhower years, a
period which most activists would contend was not
particularly noted for efforts to promote a substan-
tially lower unemployment rate. The major difference
between these two episodes is the rate of inflation.
The overall price index rose at a2percent average
annual rate from 1952 to 1960, and continued to rise
slowly until the mid-1960s, But then the rate of price
increase accelerated, and has been at about a 5 per-
cent rate since 1968.
Another lesson is that price and vvage controls are
not an effective method of curbing inflation when ag-
gregate demand is near capacity output, contrary to
the dominant view of the past decade. The imple-
mentation of such controls in 1971 quickly led to
many disruptions in the functioning of markets and
reported inflation remained high, except in the freeze
periods. After almost three years they have been
abandoned.
Experience over the past ten years casts strong
doubts regarding the effectiveness of fiscal actions in
guiding the economy along a desired path. Adoption
of the income surtax of 1968. and the imposition of
curbs on government spending since 1968, were taken
for the purpose of slowing growth of aggregate de-
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growth of aggregate demand accelerated each year.
For the period 1968 to 1973, current dollar GNP rose
at an average 8 percent annual rate, compared with
a 7 percent rate from 1960 to 1968, and a 5 percent
rate from 1952 to 1960.
A final set of lessons, and 1 believe the most im-
portant ones, are in regard to prevailing views of
monetary actions, One view was that monetary ac-
tions were important in only an accommodative sense
of keeping interest rates from rising too high or too
rapidly. Another view was that the influence of mone-
tary actions was best measured by movements in
market interest rates, not by changes in growth of the
money stock.
The validity of these propositions has been ques-
tioned as a result of the experience of the past decade.
An extensive body of research has emerged regarding
the influence of monetary actions, measured by
changes in the money stock, on economic activity.
Rather than cite specific research studies. I will sum-
marize some conclusions of these studies,
First, there is considerable evidence consistent with
the proposition that inflation is primarily a monetary
phenomenon. This proposition holds that an increase
in the trend growth of money is followed by an in-
crease in the rate of inflation. This proposition thus
attributes the basic cause of our present inflation to
the accelerating trend growth of money since the early
1960s. The money stock rose at about a 2 percent
average annual rate from 1952 to 1962, accelerated to
a 4 percent rate in the period ending 1966, accelerated
further to a 6 percent rate in the period ending 1971,
and has been at abont a 7 percent rate since then.
Accelerations in the rate of inflation have followed
accelerations in the trend growth of money.
Second, these studies present evidence consistent
with the proposition that short-run accelerations and
decelerations in the rate of money growth are fol-
lowed, with a short lag, by similar movements in
growth of real output. It is thus concluded that mone-
tary actions, measured by changes in the money stock,
are an important cause of economic fluctuations.
A third lesson is that market interest rates are a poor
indicator of the tightness or ease of monetary actions,
and that the use of market interest rates in conducting
monetary policy can ultimately lead to accelerating
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which was rediscovered in the past decade, that mar-
ket interest rates embody an inflation premium. Ac-
cording to this proposition, accelerating inflation is
accompanied by rising market interest rates. To the
extent that an accelerating trend growth of money
results in accelerating inflation, the high interest rates
of the past decade do not indicate monetary restraint.
Instead, they indicate previous excessive monetary
ease. Moreover, attempts by monetary authorities to
resist rising market interest rates, following their rec-
ommended accommodative role, required larger pur-
chases of government securities in the open market
which ultimately resulted in faster money growth,
greater inflation, and still higher interest rates.
Another lesson is that government deficits are an
important cause of accelerating money growth. Large
deficits, other factors held constant, tend to increase
market interest rates, which in turn have been resisted
by monetary authorities. Such resistance was con-
sistent with the accommodative role assigned to mone-
tary actions. These rapidly growing purchases of gov-
ernment securities provided much of the basis for the
accelerating growth of money.
A final lesson regarding monetary actions is that
if inflation is to he avoided, these actions should be
directly concerned with inflation and carried out on a
long-run basis. This is contrary to the prevailing view
that monetary actions should be primarily concerned
with output and employment and should be con-
ducted on a short-run basis. Monetary actions during
the last ten years have been directed, at various times,
toward achieving such short-run objectives as lower
market interest rates, protection of thrift institutions
and the housing industry, or a reduction of the unem-
ployment rate, In attempting to achieve these objec-
tives, the trend rate of money growth has been ratch-
eted upward. The endresult has been the present high
trend rate of monetary expansion and high inflation.
CURRENT ASSESSMENTS AND
POLICY PROPOSALS DIVERGE
It is my opinion that the economic outlook depends
critically on how stabilization actions are altered in
view of the aforementioned lessons. With these lessons
in the background, let us now examine some of the
implications for inflation and the economic outlook.
Over the past four or five months a wide diverg-
ence has developed in economists’ evaluations of the
underlying strength of the economy. There are those
who have viewed the economy as being weak and
getting weaker. Considerable concern has been raised
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about the prospects for rising unemployment and
falling real output. Other economists believe the eco-
nomy is basically strong, and they are greatly con-
cerned about inflation.
Now that the latest report on the national income
accounts indicates, as was widely expected, that out-
put of goods and services fell sharply in the first
quarter, some politicians from both major political
parties and many well-known economists have called
for stimulative government action. They do so in spite
of an acceleration of inflation to about an 11 percent
annual rate in the first quarter.
They argue that the purchasing power of house-
holds is being so eroded by inflation that there is in-
sufficient aggregate demand relative to our country’s
productive potential. According to that view, a tax cut
is needed immediately to increase household purchas-
ing power in order to boost aggregate demand and
to prevent further deterioration of output and em-
ployment. Some who hold this view have also urged
that the Federal Reserve actively seek lower market
interest rates in order to achieve what they would
consider to be an easier monetary policy designed to
stimulate housing and capital investment. The analy-
sis underlying this recommendation is based on the
same approach that dominated thinking about stabili-
zation policy over the past two decades.
In contrast to that position is the one I share with
the other group of economic analysts. That is, the
economy is fundamentally very strong and there is
more than adequate aggregate demand to promote
real expansion. I view the slower growth in real out-
put after the first quarter of 1973 as being attributable
to the economy operating “flat-out” at full capacity in
an environment where price and wage controls se-
verely reduced the efficiency of the market system in
allocating resources in the production process.
Id onot see how the existence of wide-spread short-
ages of commodities and sharply rising prices can be
viewed as characteristics of weak aggregate demand,
The sharp drop in real output in the first qnarter of
this year was clearly the result of the oil boycott and
related developments such as the truckers’ strike, the
allocation program, and the presence of controls on
both prices and resource movements. Only a few in-
dustries were affected and all of them were energy
related. Furthermore, unemployment in the first few
months of this year was much smaller than one would
have expected if the sharp drop in real output had
been widespread and had resulted from fundamental
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One important aspect which has been overlooked in
most analyses of the current economy is that all pre-
vious economic recessions have been preceded by a
period of sharply reduced growth in the nation’s
money stock. In my view the growth of money is a
reliable indicator of the tightness or ease of stabili-
zation policies. Since the growth of money last year
was not much slower, on balance, than in 1972, and
the 7 percent average rate of growth in money over
the past three and one-half years is the fastest for any
such period since World War II, I don’t think we
have had such restrictive actions as would cause a
recession. In fact, the approach I would take suggests
that so far the steps necessary to bring an eventual
end to the inflation have not been taken.
SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE
COURSE OF ACTION
Now, given that there are two opposing assessments
of the economic situation and, therefore, opposing
prescriptions, one is faced with a choice, Suppose we
were to adopt the policies of those who think the eco-
nomy is weak and take actions to push interest rates
down, accelerate money growth, and possibly cut
taxes. Based on the lessons of the past, I believe that
later this year we would find aggregate demand re-
maiming excessive. In such circumstances, inflation
would not subside significantly, and further upward
adjustment in the premium on interest rates attribut-
able to expectations about inflation would give us
still higher market interest rates. Consequently, the
task of cooling the economy would be even more
difficult than it is currently.
Given that situation, it would be necessary to shift
to decisively anti-inflationary policies. To do so would
mean going into 1975 with an even higher structure of
interest rates, a more rapid rate of inflation, and, be-
cause of the newly adopted restrictive policies, de-
clining growth in output and rising unemployment. If
my assessment of the economic situation is correct
and we follow policies of those who want to fight a
recession now, then the probability of both a recession
and a faster rate of inflation in 1975 is greatly
increased.
Let’s consider the opposing approach. Those of us
who see aggregate demand as being very strong and
inflation as the most serious problem would argue
that the trend rate of money growth should be re-
duced immediately to about a 5 percent rate for the
balance of this year. The actions necessary to achieve
this might involve even higher short-term market in-
terests rates for a few months, hut then late in the year
or early next year we would be making tangible
progress toward both less inflation and lower interest
rates. Past experience suggests that following this
course would minimize the risk of further acceleration
in the rate of inflation while also setting the stage for
further real output growth next year.
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